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In

Subject: Daniel Ruble's Honors Paper
To: Michelle Blackwell <mblackwe@utk.edu>
Hi Michelle,
Just a note to let you know that I've carefully studied Daniel Ruble's Honors
Paper. It is an excellent paper (A grade), and my only minor criticism is that
he could have mentioned Sears and McDonald's substantial real estate holdings.
I'm extremely pleased with the exceptional quality of Daniel's work. Please
let me know if there is anything else that I need to do.
Thank you.
AI Auxier
******************************************************

Albert (AI) Auxier, Ph.D, CPCU
Flaskerud Investments Teaching Scholar and
Associate Professor of Finance
420 Stokely Mgt. Ctr.
University of Tennessee
Knoxville, TN. 37996-0540
Voice (865) 974-1714 I FAX (865) 974-1716
Specializing in Financial Planning,
Insurance, and Investments
"The truly big investment idea can usually be explained in a
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Overview

Last year, I set out to manage a $20,000 stock portfolio, applying the
straightforward investing approach of legends Warren E. Buffett, the second richest man
in the world, and Benjamin Graham, Buffett's infamous mentor. Rather than speculating
about what price a security will sell for in the future, value investing demands a focus on
the underlying fundamental value of a business.

Instead of relying on quantitative

models or crystal balls, it relies on common sense and emotional discipline-virtues
often absent from Wall Street.
By outlining my individual investing decisions, the logic behind them, and the
results, I hope to demonstrate the extraordinary wisdom of this simple, yet wildly
unpopular, investing philosophy. Of course, I made several mistakes along the way, and
I hope to address these and to provide thoughts for improvement.
It is also important to note that I make no grand assumptions about my

performance or its sustainability. In reality, a one-year record is not indicative of longterm potential, as any fool can be lucky in the short -term.

However, only a sound

investment philosophy and outstanding ability can consistently outperform long-term.
Hopefully, through my demonstration of clear logic and solid performance, I can validate
the methodology to some degree. For my absolute confidence in value investing, I rely
on the wisdom and performance of famed investors Benjamin Graham and Warren E.
Buffett.
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Icons of Value Investing

Benjamin Graham is hailed as the "father of value investing," and rightly so. This
renowned investor, professor at Columbia University, and even classical scholar singlehandedly rationalized Wall Street.
While Graham managed his partnership, the "Benjamin Graham Joint Account,"
in the 1920s, he sought to buy stocks that were selling far below the actual value of the
underlying businesses. 25

The idea was to get stocks so ridiculously cheap, that most

downside risk would be eliminated. Graham wanted to buy $1 worth of stocks for $0.50.
This was a sharp contrast to the speculative nature of Wall Street, whose primary interest
was to trade little pieces of paper with no more consideration than what price the next
sucker would pay. A typical "investor" on Wall Street would pay $2 for $1 of stocks as
long as he thought he could sell it for $3 the next day. This irrationality and emotional
exuberance pushed equity prices to incredible highs, ultimately resulting in the great
Graham's prudent and rational style of investing helped him escape the early

Crash.

stages of the Crash with a tolerable 20% loss. However, convinced that things could not
get much worse, he bought on margin, subsequently losing 70% of his partnership's
value. 25
His later endeavor, Graham-Newman, was much more successful.

Over the

partnership's 21-year life (1936-1956), Graham-Newman demonstrated an astounding
average yearly return of just below 17%, which contrasts to less than 14% for the S&P
500 over the same period.

27

While spectacular, this return figure neglects one of the

company's most successful investments, GEl CO-whose shares were distributed to
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shareholders. Assuming that these investors held the GEICO shares, their participation in
27
Graham-Newman would have earned them a return that doubled that 0 f the S&P 500.

Security Analysis, which Graham co-authored, emerged in 1934. At the time, the

same "investors" that had once seen the stock market as a place of infinite opportunity
refused to consider stocks as investments at all. Graham, unlike most of Wall Street,
recognized the cyclical nature of human emotion.

Security Analysis identifies the

"intrinsic value" of a company as independent of the market's quoted price. In the shortterm, the market is a "voting machine," in which people make decisions based on facts as
well as the whims of emotion. However, in the long-term, the market will ultimately act
more like a "weighing machine," where a company's competitive position, assets, and
earnings are accurately "weighed" and reflected in a logical market quote 2

Gross

misstatements of price resulting from skewed investor psychology create opportunities
for the value investor in the short-term. The idea is to buy a business based on calculated
intrinsic value, and to wait for the market to take note over time.
Ben Graham further detailed his investing philosophy in The Intelligent Investor
(key ideas are discussed below), which Warren Buffett describes as "by far the best book
on investing ever written.,,14 Indeed, it changed the life of 19-year-old Buffett in 1950
when he first read it.
Buffett had traded stocks since he was eleven, and unsuccessfully so. He had
tried his share of stock tips and chart analyses, but he found a logical alternative to such
unsuccessful speculation in Graham's simple and straightforward methodologies. 14
Buffett later studied under Graham at Columbia University (earning the only A+ ever
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granted by Graham) and even worked for Graham at Graham-Newman C orp. 26 Buffiett
was enamored with Graham's sensible instruction. He had literally found an idol.
To say that Warren Buffett has been a successful value investor would be a gross
understatement. In less than half a century, he has successfully turned a $10,000 nest egg
into a $42,900,000,000 empire, making him the second richest man in the world-second
only to his good friend Bill Gates. 16
His extraordinary record can be tracked through the performance of his
investment vehicle, Berkshire Hathaway. From 1964, when Buffett took the company
over, until 2003, the per-share book value of Berkshire increased a total of 259,485%
compared to a 4,743 increase in the S&P 500, dividends included. This equates to a
22.2% average annual gain vs. 10.4% for the S&P. 5 The price appreciation of Berkshire

has been even more phenomenal, climbing from around $19 when Buffett took over in
1964 to over $93,000 on April 25, 2004.

This represents a total return of nearly

490,000% and an average annual return of over 24%30

Key Principles of Value Investing

In an October 2003 presentation to University of Tennessee business students,
Warren Buffett explained that successful investing can be achieved through the
application of three simple ideas-stocks as part of a business, Mr. Market, and margin
of safety.

All of these ideas are demonstrated in Graham's The Intelligent Investor.

Buffett stresses the importance of each, stating, "You can't get rid of one leg of a threelegged stool and have a sound investment philosophy.,,14
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Stocks as Part of a Business:

A stock is ultimately a share in a business, giving the owner a claim against the
assets and income of an enterprise.

Thus, it only makes sense for an investor to be

concerned with the fundamental prospects of the underlying business, not simply the
price behavior of its quoted shares.
Buffett admits,
"1 used to know, when 1 was eleven or twelve, the ticker symbol of every company virtually on the
New York Stock exchange [ ... ] but 1 didn't know what was behind them. 1 had to start looking at
these little symbols and names in the paper as businesses and decide how you value a business
[ ... ] and what counts"

14

Buffett was only a child when he made this silly mistake. Amazingly, educated
Wall Street professionals are often completely oblivious to the nature or value of the
businesses underlying the stocks they are trading. As Graham and Dodd state in Security
Analysis, "It is an almost unbelievable fact that Wall Street never asks, 'How much is the
business selling for?'"

4

In The Intelligent Investor, Graham addresses this issue in a telling distinction
between a silent partner in a private business and a common stockholder. The private
investor would concern himself solely with the prospects of the business, and would
determine the value of his investment by calculating his relative share of the company's
balance sheet items and expected earnings.

On the other hand, the common stock

investor, although in a very similar position, is alienated from his ownership in the
business simply because his interest can be sold or purchased at whim. Because he has
the luxury of a liquid market with readily quoted prices, the investor behaves more like a
speculator. As graham puts it,
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"The speculator's primary interest lies in anticipating and profiting from market fluctuations. The
investor's primary interest lies in acquiring and holding suitable securities at suitable prices."

18

Thus, as investors, we need to focus on the intrinsic value of our ownership in the
underlying business and only concern ourselves with quoted prices when it is convenient
for us to do so.
It is important to note that while Ben Graham focused solely on the numbers to
value an enterprise, Buffett places a special emphasis on understanding the factors that
make a particular business special. Buffett wants predictability in his investments, even
demanding that he have an idea of what a company will look like, say, ten years down the
road. Buffett explains in his 1992 Letter to Shareholders:
"[W]e try to stick with businesses we believe we understand. That means they must be relatively
simple and stable in character. If a business is complex or subject to constant change, we're not
smart enough to predict future cash flows."

10

This is precisely why Buffett avoids high-tech companies.

Indeed, none of Berkshire

Hathaway's subsidiaries or equity holdings are "sexy" investments by any stretch of the
imagination. But as Buffett notes in his 1987 Letter to Shareholders:
"Severe change and exceptional returns usually don't mix ... [T]he best business returns are usually
achieved by companies that are doing something quite similar today to what they were doing five
or ten years ago ...

,,7

Certainly, the inflation and subsequent deflation of the dot-com bubble, contrasted with
Buffett's consistently superior historical investment

performance,

validates this

affirmation.
In addition to simplicity and understandability, Buffett finds great predictability in
companies that have a durable competitive advantage, which Buffett metaphorically
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describes as a "moat around an economic castle."

14

The very nature of capitalism breeds

competition. Everyone is trying to get what somebody else has.

A company cannot

sustain any extraordinary profitability in the long-term if it is vulnerable to competitive
actions of other companies. A moat prevents, or at least delays, other companies from
attacking an economic castle. A great example of a competitive moat is Wal-Mart, which
enjoys an incredibly low cost structure through its massive economies of scale. Nobody
can compete with Wal-Mart because nobody is large enough to realize enough cost
savings to compete on price.

At the Fall 2004 meeting with UT students, Buffett

explained that a "moat" could even be something as intangible as an idea that consumers
have about a particular company or its products. He elaborates, "There are six billion
people in the world. Practically all of them have something in their mind about CocaCola, largely favorable. They don't have anything in their mind about RC Cola, and if
RC Cola spent $1 billion advertising they wouldn't have anything in their mind about RC
Cola ... That's an enduring competitive advantage." 14

Mr. Market:

Ben Graham offers a simple, logical framework for dealing with market
fluctuations in his famous Chapter 8 of The Intelligent Investor, and does so through his
personification of the market, Mr. Market.
Graham explains in his famous allegory:
"Imagine that in some private business you own a small share that cost you $1.000. One of your
partners, named Mr. Market, is very obliging indeed. Every day he tells you what he thinks your
interest is worth and furthermore offers to buy you out or to sell you an additional interest on that
basis. Sometimes his idea of value appears plausible .... Often, on the other hand, Mr. Market lets
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his enthusiasm or his fears run away with him, and the value he proposes to you seems to you a
little short of silly." 21

Buffett takes the description of Mr. Market one-step further, even referring to him
as an "alcoholic manic-depressive,,14 The idea here is that people are emotional beings,
and they often let their emotions run away with them. This human trait is common in
both individuals and in crowds, which translates into extreme volatility in markets. At
his UT presentation, Buffett noted how remarkable the stock market is, explaining that
even the best American companies often sell at yearly highs that are twice the value of
the lows.

Such variation in perceived value would rarely occur in, say, the value of a

home or any other non-traded asset.
When people are excited, they tend to become irrational on the upside, trading
securities for often astronomical values.
"craze" of the late 90s.

This was certainly the case during the dot-com

Companies such as Yahoo.com were selling for hundreds of

times their expected earnings, and the reality is that most of these companies were losing
money. While the opportunities opened up by the Internet are certainly fantastic, Wall
Street became overly euphoric.

In fact, even though dot-com stock prices certainly

seemed to exceed value by all traditional measures, seemingly intelligent, well-educated
analysts were hopelessly justifying their buy recommendations based on ridiculous
measures of the "new economy," such as price-to-sales ratios and revenue growth-all of
which neglect the ultimate goal of investors: profit. It is clear that in such euphoria,
instead of buying stocks with consideration of company fundamentals and earnings
potential, people soon begin to buy stocks simply because the prices are rising, hoping to
sell their already expensive shares to the next sucker that comes along at an even higher
price. The result is a vicious cycle.
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As Graham would have predicted, though, the exponential price performances of
the dot-com companies were equally spectacular on the downside. As stated in Security

Analysis:
"That enormous profits should have turned into still more colossal losses, that new theories should
have been developed and later discredited, that unlimited optimism should have been succeeded
by the deepest despair are all in strict accord with age-old tradition." 3

Indeed, at the end of 1999, Yahoo.com closed at a split-adjusted price of $216.
The following year, it sold for $30, later selling for $8. The NASDAQ itself reached a
peak of over 5,000 in 2000, falling dramatically to under 1,500 over the subsequent three
years. 30 The lesson here is that irrational bull markets are not sustainable, and investors
will sooner or later take note of reality.

This was a painful lesson to learn for many

people who lost entire fortunes during the dot-com bubble.

Buffett and Graham,

however, would stress that the lesson has not bean learned, and that people will behave
just as irrationally again.
It is important to note that fear can drive the stocks to irrationally low prices just

as greed and excitement can drive them to astronomically high prices.
instance, the investing climate after the great Crash.

Consider, for

In 1934, Security Analysis

recognized that stocks were largely discredited as an investment at all. Because people
were fearful about the possibility of another Crash, what had been seen as the land of
infinite opportunity and riches (Wall Street) was largely being avoided by investors
altogether. As Graham noted in a June 1932 Forbes article, many companies were selling
for less than their cash in the bank.

17

While Graham saw value in the 1932 market, most of Wall Street did not. Why
so? A common misconception is that the market serves to instruct or give signals to
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investors.

Indeed, many people buy because prices rise or sell because they decline.

Because prices had declined from steep highs in the Crash, investors saw the potential for

loss, neglecting even to consider the incredible value that the low prices represented.
Graham points out that this defies all common business sense, for profit maximization
requires buying low and selling high.

By reacting to fluctuations in such a manner,

investors are, "perversely transforming [their] basic advantage into a basic disadvantage."
20

By demonstrating emotional discipline, the value investor can take advantage of
such market folly. As Buffett notes in the preface of The Intelligent Investor, "The sillier
the market's behavior, the greater the opportunity for the business-like investor."vii The
great thing about Mr. Market is that an investor does not have to accept his offer unless it
is advantageous. Every day, he will come along with a new one. The intelligent investor
will catch Mr. Market on a bad day and, essentially, rip the poor drunk off

Margin of Safety:

The margin of safety concept is the crux of sound investing. In Graham's famous
Chapter 21 of The Intelligent Investor he states, "[To] distill the secret of sound investing
into three words, we venture the motto, MARGIN OF SAFETY." 23
Basically, Graham suggests that an investor should buy a company at a deep
discount to its intrinsic value. While bargain hunting certainly seems like a no-brainer
recommendation, how can an investor ever know whether or not he or she is buying
$1.00 for $0.50? The answer is simple: one does not know!
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The problem is that investors have to make heroic assumptions in determining the
intrinsic value of a company (see Valuation Model section below). Without a crystal ball
that actually works, nobody can know for sure how profitable a company will be in the
future. Unknown factors such as catastrophic litigation, changing industry dynamics, and
corporate fraud can seriously impede future earnings growth ... if not even bankrupt an
enterprise. Moreover, the lay investor only has limited access to company information
and, thus, may have difficulty in deriving appropriate estimates in the first place.
Leaving some "cushion" room to compensate for this ambiguity is only logical.

By

demanding a discount to calculated intrinsic value, an investor is protecting him or
herself against inevitable uncertainty.
Buffett explains this simple logic in his appendix to The Intelligent Investor, "The
Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville":
"You don't try and buy businesses worth $83 million for $80 million. You leave yourself an
enonnous margin. When you build a bridge, you insist it can carry 30,000 pounds, but you only
drive 10,OOO-pound trucks across it. And that same principle works in investing." 24

My Portfolio

On February 11, 2003, I began investing $20,000 through an online brokerage
account with Ameritrade, Inc. With no personal investing experience and no professional
advice, I produced a twelve-month return of 56.70% (after brokerage fees), beating the
vast majority of professionally managed equity funds. This return compares to a 41.79%
return for the S&P 500 over the same twelve-month period (February 11, 2003 February 11, 2004).
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*Note that the S&P 500 is the most appropriate benchmark with which to compare my investing results.
capitalization-weighted index includes 500 companies that span every part of the U.S economy.

This

By tracking its performance,

investors can approximate the average return of U.S. equities, and, thus, have a good measure of alternative investment opportunities.
In contrast, the Dow includes only 30 large industrial companies, and the NASDAQ is largely comprised of small. obscure companies.
Moreover, the risk/reward profiles of these two indexes are largely skewed, as the Dow is very conservative, while the NASDAQ is
very risky. Note that an investor would have assumed more risk (possibility of loss) to achieve the higher returns that the NASDAQ
produced over this 12-month period.

Given the volatile nature of the NASDAQ and its components. this short-term performance

might not be indicative oflong-term results.

Below, I describe the factors that contributed to this performance, the logic of
some of my individual decisions, and a multitude of dumb mistakes.

Concentration versus Diversification:

At any given time, I held no more than eleven different stocks in my portfolio.
Notice the table depicting my 2/1112004
Symbol

Price

PFE
GE
HD
BRK.B
HDI
HCA
CAH
HMC
TAP.B

$
51.80
$
38.15
33.08
$
$
36.83
$ 3,057.00
$
53.36
$
43.89
$
65.75
$
21.62
$
18.20

portfolio on the last day of the KO
investment period.

Not only was

my entire account invested in just
ten companies, but I was also very
willing

to

commit

capital to a select few.

substantial
In fact,

almost one third of my entire

Shares
50
50
75
75
1
40
65
78
230
175

Cash

Total:

Value

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

2,590.00
1,907.50
2,481.00
2,762.25
3,057.00
2,134.40
2,852.85
5,128.50
4,972.60
3,185.00

Weight
8.26%
6.09%
7.92%
8.81%
9.75%
6.81%
9.10%
16.36%
15.87%
10.16%

$

268.01

0.86%

$

31,339.11

100.00%

portfolio was invested in just two companies, Cardinal Health (CAR) and Honda Motor
Company (HMC)
This is in sharp contrast with academia's view that a portfolio should be widely
diversified, often suggesting more than thirty stocks. The simple logic here is iterated in
the old saying, "Don't put all your eggs in one basket." By spreading funds over many
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holdings, an investor reduces the risk of loss. If one "basket" falls, then all of the eggs
are broken, and nobody wants that.
Buffett would argue otherwise. In his 1978 Letter to Shareholders, he states:
"Our policy is to concentrate holdings. We try to avoid buying a little of this or that when we are
only lukewarm about the business or its price. When we are convinced as to attractiveness. we
believe in buying worthwhile amounts." 6

By following a concentration strategy, an investor will be much more successful
if he or she can select sound investments. Of course, successful concentration depends
on the time, effort, and skill an investor is willing to devote to researching and
understanding businesses.

An enterprising investor can actually reduce risk by

concentrating in a handful of stocks. This is certainly contrary to statistical theory, but
the idea makes perfect sense. By holding only a handful of companies, an investor can
exercise a much deeper and more sophisticated understanding of the positions held. With
this superior knowledge, an investor can make much more rational decisions, and can
anticipate and monitor the business prospects and risk profile of specific companies. As
long as the decisions are sound, concentration can be relatively safe. In a 1998 speech to
the Foundation Financial Officers Group, Charlie Munger-Buffett's famed business
partner and Vice Chairman of Berkshire Hathaway-stressed, "In the United States, a
person or institution with almost all wealth invested, long-term, in just three fine
domestic corporations is securely rich." 29
On the other hand, if an investor is passive and is not willing to commit time and
effort to carefully scrutinize and select individual securities, or if potential investments
are particularly risky, then a diversification strategy makes sense. The more securities
held in a single portfolio, the less any single mistake or loss will affect overall return. A
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passive investor, however, can only expect to earn average returns. After all, the more
diversified a portfolio is, the more it will emulate the broad market.
Another argument for concentration is that good investment ideas are simply hard
to come by. In his 1993 Letter to Shareholders, Buffett even claimed, "[W]e'll now settle
for one good idea a year. (Charlie says it's my turn.)"

11

When a "fat pitch" or "no-

brainer" (as he puts it) comes along, it makes sense to make a meaningful investment. If
an investor does not commit heavily to his or her best ideas, remaining funds must be
dispersed among less attractive opportunities. Again, in his 1993 Letter to Shareholders,
Buffett comments:
"1 cannot understand why an investor ... elects to put money into a business that is his 20 th
favorite rather than simply adding that money to his top choices - the businesses he understands
best and that present the least risk, along with the greatest profit potential."

11

* See the "Mistakes" section below for a description of my failure in pulling the
trigger on my favorite investments.

Valuation Model:

To buy a company at a deep discount to its intrinsic value, an investor must have
a framework for approximating this value.

For my portfolio, I use a PricelEarnings

model adopted by the University of Tennessee's TVA Investment Challenge team, which
has been immensely successful in substantially beating the S&P 500 every year since its
1998 inception.
Essentially the model takes the current annual earnings of a company and projects
them out five years into the future. The resulting future earnings figure is then applied to
a future PricelEarnings ratio to derive a future price for the enterprise. This value is
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discounted back to determine the present value of this future price.

To account for

dividend income, an annuity due function is applied in which future dividends are
discounted back to their present value.

The combined capital gains and dividend

components result in an approximation of intrinsic value-which basically tells an
investor what future cash flows are worth today after being discounted at an appropriate
rate to account for risk and alternative investment opportunities.
The applied formulas are as follows:

where:

where:

"FV_Price" represents the future price ofthe stock
"PE" represents the future price/earnings ratio
"EPS" represents the most recent annual earnings per share figure
"g" represents expected earnings growth rate
"n" represents the holding period for the investment

"PV_Price" represents the present value the future price
"i" represents the periodic discount rate

PV_Div = DN * (1
where:

+~)

* [(1- «1 + ~) / (1 + i))") / (i - g)]

"PV_Div" represents the present value of an annuity due for dividends
"DIV' represents the current annual dividend
"gd" represents the ex-pected growth rate for dividends

Intrinsic Value = PV_Price + PV_ Div
The Coca-Cola Co.

To simplifY these calculations,
I use the TVA Investment Challenge
team's excel-based model, as depicted
here in my 2/10/2004 valuation of the

Current Price

$39511

Intrinsic Value

$47791

Margin of Safety

2095%1

Expected Return

1442%1

FV Price

$70861
Future PIE
EPS (Dec 02)
Long Term Growth Rate
Holding Period

Coca-Cola Company:
Notice that in this particular

(1<0)

25
~1.75

-

1 1 --

5

PVDividend
Current DiVidend
Long Term Growth Rate
Discount Rate

case, I calculated an intrinsic value of

8

~

1.0811

PVPrice
Tangible Book Value
P,iee' Book Value
Current PIE
Historic.1 P/E-

$379\

$4400\
$3.26

1212
22.45

36.75
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$47.79, representing a 20.95% margin of safety. This value, however, is not intended to
be extremely accurate. It should only serve as a guide for intelligent decision-making.
To determine this intrinsic value, I had to make numerous assumptions about the
company's future earning prospects, a possible future price/earnings ratio, and an
appropriate discount rate.

Even a slight change in any of these estimates leads to

strikingly different calculations.
For the earnings growth expectations, I typically rely heavily on the First Call
consensus estimates, which can be obtained from Yahoo. com.

This is essentially the

average expectation of all Wall Street analysts covering the stock.

If I suspect that

analysts are overly optimistic, I typically reduce the rate by several hundred basis points
for the sake of conservatism.

While the Coca-Cola Company offered guidance for

earnings growth of 11-12%, I felt that 10% was a more prudent assumption given the
company's large size and the mature industry in which it operates. Had I assumed an
earnings growth rate of 12%, the intrinsic value calculation would have jumped to
$51.94, representing a 31.45% margin of safety.
The future price/earnings assumptions are even more ambiguous. Essentially, this
ratio represents what investors are willing to pay for every dollar of a particular
company's earnings per share. Thus, this factor is entirely psychological. Since a value
investor is not in the business of predicting investor sentiment, it only makes sense to
analyze historical information and future prospects to derive a normalized PIE estimation.
In the case of Coca-Cola, its 10-year historical PIE is 36.75 (average of highs and lows on
S&P Stock Reports). This is huge premium to the broad market (selling for about 18
times forward earnings on 4129/2004), but this premium is largely warranted due to Coca-
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Cola's durable competitive advantage (brand image and economies of scale), financial
prowess, and consistent historical performance. Even so, I assume a much lower PIE
multiple of 25x.

Had I assumed a multiple of 30x, the valuation model would have

yielded an intrinsic value of $56.59, representing a 43.22% margin of safety. However,
my reduced estimate is only prudent, as a conservative investor should shy away from
valuations that are contingent on extremely high PIE multiples, and thus investor
optimism.
Discount rate assumptions are also extremely fuzzy. This rate should reflect the
return demanded by an investor for a company with a particular risk profile.

In the

TV AlC model, I typically assign a discount rate of 10% or so to the safest companies
(like Coca-Cola), and vary the rate up to 15% for riskier companies. Admittedly, this is
largely arbitrary and off the Wall. These figures are certainly larger than the 7% returns
that Warren Buffett told UT students to expect over the next 40 years, but higher discount
rates yield more conservative calculations. 14 Therefore, 10-15% discount rates seem to
be quite sensible.
The bottom line is that any intrinsic value calculation is going to be very fuzzy.
This is precisely why an intelligent investor should demand a huge discount to intrinsic
value. In fact, the margin should probably be so large that a precise calculation of value
is not even necessary.

At Berkshire Hathaway's 1996 Annual Shareholder Meeting,

Buffett stated,
"If you have to actually do it with pencil and paper. it's too close to think about. It ought to just

kind of scream at you that you've got this huge margin of safety."

13

Such was the case with my purchase of Sears (discussed below).
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Portfolio "Risk":

Buffett is very critical of academia's definition of risk with respect to securities.
Even the Investments course at the University of Tennessee (Finance 425) teaches
students that beta is the appropriate measure of risk for individual securities. Beta is
essentially measured by the coefficient (slope) of a regression that plots the historical
performance of a particular company's stock against that of the broad market (S&P 500).
For instance, if a stock has consistently risen 20% while the S&P 500 has gained 10%
over a given period, the stock would have a beta of approximately 2.0. This high beta
indicates that the stock is much more volatile than the overall market. If the S&P 500
were to fall 10%, an academic would expect the stock to fall lose 20% of its value.
Fundamentally, this makes absolutely no sense as a measure of "risk."

Beta

measures no more than a stock's volatility. An investor with a long-term focus should
not be concerned by the manic depressive and alcoholic nature of Mr. Market. As long as
an investor buys a business at a fair price, Mr. Market's changing attitude toward the
individual pieces of that business should be of no concern to the investor. In fact, this
"risk" is actually to the value investor's benefit, since volatile price behavior presents
many opportunities for an investor to capitalize on Mr. Market's idiocy.
What's more, by focusing solely on the price behavior of securities, academics
entirely neglect the underlying characteristics of the businesses in which they are
investing. Buffett elaborates in his 1993 Letter to Shareholders:
"In assessing risk, a beta purist will disdain examining what accompany produces. what its
competitors are doing, or how much borrowed money the business employs. He may even prefer
not to know the company's name."

11
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This line of thinking is absurd. Buffett might say that it can be equated to watching a
scoreboard instead of the baseball game itself or driving through the rearview mirror.
In his appendix to The Intelligent Investor, "The Superinvestors of Graham-andDoddsville," Buffett further explains the absurdity of the beta measurement for risk by
describing his investment in The Washington Post, which was selling for $80 million in
the market and, as Buffett claims, was worth $400 million in assets alone:
"[I]f the stock had declined even further to a price that made the valuation $40 million instead of
$80 million, its beta would have been greater. And to people who think beta measures risk, the
cheaper price would have made it look riskier. This is truly Alice in Wonderland. I have never
been able to figure out why it's riskier to buy $400 million worth of properties for $40 million
than $80 million." 24

Indeed, the entire concept of a risk/reward tradeoff is largely skewed here.

While

academia teaches us that we must assume more "risk" if we are to expect greater returns,
value investing demonstrates that buying stocks cheap can actually decrease risk (by
minimizing potential loss) and increase profit potential simultaneously.

Certainly, by

buying The Washington Post at $40 million, Buffett could have achieved both of these
ends.
The invalidity of beta

IS

likewise demonstrated by my own investment

2/1112004

performance.

As of

211112004, the weighted

average beta of my
personal portfolio was
approximately 0.55.

If

beta were an accurate

Symbol

KO
PFE
GE
HD
BRKB
HDI
HCA
CAH
HMC
TAP.B

Price
Shares
51.80
50
$
$
38.15
50
33.08
$
75
$
36.83
75
$ 3,057.00
1
53.36
$
40
$
43.89
65
65.75
$
78
21.62
$
230
$
18.20
175

Cash

Total:

Value
Weight
Beta
Weighted Beta
$
2,590.00
8.26%
0.286
0.0236
$
1,907.50
6.09%
0.378
0.0230
$
2,481.00
7.92%
1.103
0.0873
$
2,762.25
8.81%
1.401
0.1235
$
3,057.00
975%
0.415
0.0405
$
2,134.40
6.81%
1.095
0.0746
$
2,852.85
9.10%
0.15
0.0137
$
5,128.50
16.36%
0.105
0.0172
$
4,972.60
15.87%
0.531
0.0843
$
3,185.00
10.16%
0.6
0.0610

$

268.01

0.86%

0

$

31,339,11

100,00%

0.5486
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indicator of risk and, thus, expected relative perfonnance, my portfolio should have
returned something along the lines of 22% (41% S&P 500 return multiplied by my .55
beta). Thus, by achieving a return of over 56%, I actually earned money on risks that I
did not even take!

Academia might simply explain this "abnonnality" to be a freak

occurrence. The intelligent investor knows better.

A Quality Bias:
An investor should have a preference for strong, high-quality companies. In his

1989 Letter to Shareholders, Buffett declared, "It's far better to buy a wonderful company
at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price."

8

If an investor pays too much

for a great company, it is far more likely that the he will eventually recoup his
investment. With a poor quality company, future prospects are not as predictable, and,
thus, mistakes are much more painful.
In building my portfolio, I made sure that I established a solid foundation of
Purchases
Value Line Metrics
Symbol
Financial Strength Earnings Predictability
KG
A++
85
PFE
A++
100
GE
A++
95
HD
A++
90
BRK.b
A+
5
MCD
A++
95
~N
A
%
HDI
A
100
A
85
S
H~
A
~
SNV
B++
100
BAX
A+
85
CAH
A
100
HMC
B++
75
TAP.b
B++
5

quality companies. In my first day
of investing, I purchased CocaCola, General Electric, Pfizer, and
Home Depot, all of which carried
high rankings Value Line's metrics
for both financial strength and
earmngs

predictability.

maintained this

I

commitment to

quality throughout the investment period, and I am confident that this quality bias
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significantly contributed to my performance. Indeed, two of my best performers were my
high-quality holdings in Home Depot and McDonald's, returning 70.27% and 61.11%
(after fees but excluding dividends), respectively. (See appendix for more detailed return
information. )

Two Illustrations: MCD and S
MCD: Before considering these two investments, it is important to understand that value

investing is requires more common sense and simple thought than complex mathematical
models and meticulous calculation. The logic behind a decision should be so simple that
it can be explained in a few words. In his 1994 Letter to Shareholders, Buffett notes,
"The truly big investment idea can usually be explained in a short paragraph." 12
McDonald's enjoys one of the strongest brands in the world, generates tons of
cash, and maintains a solid balance sheet. However, leading into 2003, the company's
same-store sales began to suffer from poor quality, slow service, and an un-kept
appearance at many of its locations, from a shift in eating preferences toward casual
dining (Panera Bread, etc.) over fast food chains, and from growing social concerns over
obesity and other health issues. Moreover, low-priced items (such as the dollar menu)
were eating into margins due to a looming price war with Burger King. Needless to say,
times were tough.
All of these problems, to me, seemed to be short-term concerns. First of all,
social trends shift all the time, so the obesity and casual dining factors had little to no
influence on my long-term outlook for the company.

Additionally, the price wars are

common, and I expected that this too would normalize in the future. The main problem
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was that management seemed incapable of keeping the company on top. The concerns
over deteriorating quality and service were valid in that these issues could have seriously
injured the company's strong brand image and, thus, long-term competitive advantage.
Luckily, new management was already in place, and the new CEO, Jim Cantalupo,
seemed very committed to dramatically improving the quality, service, and cleanliness at
all existing restaurant locations. In short, it looked like this ship would soon turn around,
and the company certainly had a fantastic capital structure to facilitate the process.
Mr. Market, however, was back to his old self, off drinking somewhere in the
corner. Mr. Market, in a drunken stupor, was only concerned with the short-term, unable
to look past the most recent decline in same-store sales or quarterly earnings
disappointment.

This great company, which expected to earn $1.35 for the year, was

selling for a mere $13.50. This represented a PIE multiple of just lOx. Not only did this
contrast
company's

sharply
historical

to

McDonald's Corp. (MCD)

the

PIE

of

23.3x, but it also traded at a steep

Current Price

$13561

Intrinsic Value

$21171

Margin of Safety

56WIoj

Expected Return

2198%1

discount to the broad market. 28
FV Price

Regardless
estimates

III

of

my

valuing

$32401
Future PIE
EPS (Dec 02)
Long Term Growth Rate
Holding Period

the

17.5
$1.32

1.07
5

PVDividend

company, it was obvious that
MCD was a steal at $13.50.

$1951
Current Dividend
Long Term Growth Rate
Discount Rate

I

.4

~
11

1.11

PVPrice

calculated an intrinsic value of
$21. 17, representing a whopping
56.16% margin of safety.

Not

Tang. Book Value
Price' Book Value
Current PIE
Historical PIE~
·Est. 2003 EPS is $1.35
-First Call lists 8% future 5-yr growth)
~Average of High/Low Averages for the last 10 years.

$19231
$688
1.97
10.27
23.3
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only was 1 buying a wonderful company, but also 1 was buying it at a wonderful price.
Looking at the chart, it is interesting to note the great price at which 1 purchased
MCD.

While 1 certainly bought near a low, 1 was not trying to make any grand
Splits:'"

MCDONALDS CORP
as of 20-Apr-2004
35

40

~ 30

o

::: 20
......

£16~~~~~MI~~~II~~~uMMlMI~~~~W.~~bI~~~

Copyright 2004 Yahoo! Inc.

http://finance.yahoo.com/

predictions about the price at which the stock would sell in the near future. 1 simply
found great value in what 1 was getting for my money. Luckily, 1 did not have to wait
long for Mr. Market to sober up. A momentum investor, on the other hand, would have
seen my entry point as a horrible time to buy, simply because the stock had been on such
a decline. Likewise, a momentum investor would have likely bought MCD at a later date
after the stock had already risen substantially ... missing a great opportunity.
Postscript:

1 purchased 100 shares of MCD at $13.56 and sold just four

months later for $22.01 per share. This was a 61.11 % return. (I outline a couple of
mistakes here in the "Mistakes" section below.)

s:

Sears was a rare "fat pitch" and "no-brainer." The company has been around for

over a century, and is a household name, but in early March 2003, its stock was selling
for less about 4x earnings! The company was expected to earn $4.89 in 2003 was paying
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a $1 dividend per share. Yet, the stock was selling for under $22. Again, Mr. Market
was scared to death about Sears' increasing default risk in its credit card portfolio,
stronger competition in appliances from the likes of Best Buy and Home Depot, and
weak results in the company's soft lines business. Additionally, the company was highly
leveraged with a 79.5% debt/capital ratio. These fears were certainly legitimate, but the
poor drunkard (Mr. Market) was basically giving his stock away. Moreover, Sears is a
cash cow, so its dividend was stable, and the company could have easily met its debt
obligations through refinancing or a simple securitization and liquidation of its credit card
portfolio. The company was also well on its way to revitalizing its apparel business and
had signed valuable exclusive contracts with Land's End and other popular outfitters. In
short, Mr. Market was "making a mountain out of a molehill" as Ben Graham might say,
and was grossly overcompensating for relatively short-term concerns.
As Buffett would say, this presented a margin of safety that literally "screamed"
at me. The stock was selling for an ENORMOUS discount to its historical PIE of 13.25. 1
SEARS ROEBUCK & CO

Splits: ...

L_1

...

,I
••
./ "
http://finance.yahoo.com/
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Postscript:

I basically took advantage of Mr. Market's ignorance and bought

100 shares of Sears at $21.95 per share, knowing very well that it was worth over $30.
Sears soon announced that it was indeed selling its credit card portfolio, and the price
jumped dramatically.

I ended up selling three months after purchase for $33.76 and

$39.10, representing an overall capital gain of64.72%. (I outline some mistakes below).

Mistakes:

While I did outperform the S&P 500, I did make several large mistakes that kept
somewhat hindered my overall returns. I briefly outline these mistakes below.
My most difficult challenge was in exercising emotional discipline.

In The

Intelligent Investor, Ben Graham suggests that "[an] investor with a portfolio of sound
stocks should expect their prices to fluctuate and should neither be concerned by sizable
declines nor become excited by sizable advances." 22 Having never previously committed
personal funds to marketable securities, I watched my holdings like a hawk the majority
of the time. While this alone is no major crime, it certainly is a bad habit for me to
develop since my ultimate goal as a value investor is to invest with logic without
consideration of or influence by emotion.
Because I was paying so much attention to the price activity of certain stocks, I
ended up letting Mr. Market instruct me a time or two as I made a buy or sell decision. I
had already made the decision to act, but I let the market influence the timing of my
trades.

Specific examples include both my purchase and sell of Sears.

I knew that

$21.95 was a great price to buy; otherwise, I would not have bought the stock at all.
However, after watching the stock dart upward on the day, I bought hurriedly for fear that
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I would miss it altogether. Because I "chased" the stock, I ended up buying near the high
of the day, from which it subsequently fell 2.5% to close at $21.40 ... and then $19.70 the
following day. Moreover, even though I still liked the value offered and was not quite
concentrated enough in Sears, I neglected to buy more when the stock traded down to just
over $18 per share on March 14 2003, representing a PIE of just 3.8x earnings!
Basically, I had endured over a 17% loss in my Sears position at that time and was too
frightened to pull the trigger again.
Once the price jumped on the news that the company was selling its credit card
portfolio, I sold half of my position because the stock had quickly jumped over my
intrinsic value calculation.

I failed to consider, however, the true implications of the

news and the conservatism of my original estimates.

I basically sold way too cheap.

After all, at $33.76, the company was still selling for less than 7x earnings. Had I not let
my emotions control me and held my position longer, I could have potentially realized
well over a 150% gain as the stock soared

Turnover: Symbol

KO
PFE

to $56 per share.

GE
HO

This

brings

me

to

another

BRK.b

MCO
WEN

mistake: excessive activity. Excluding the

HOI
S

HCA
SNV

activity to get fully invested, my portfolio

BAX

turnover for the 12-month period was a

HCA
CAH

whopping 58.9%. This means that I sold

HMC
CAH

over half of my holdings to buy new

HMC

Bought
$ 1,988.49
$ 1,47650
$ 1,694.75
$ 1,624.25
$ 2,120.00
$ 1,35800
$ 1,256.00
$ 1,576.00
$ 2,197.00
$ 1,969.49
$ 1,931.99
$ 2,517.99
$ 1,615.99
$ 2,547.56
$ 3,02599
$ 1,567.79
$ 2,008.09
$ 2,627.24
$35,103.12

TAP.b
Totals:
Sum:
Less Initial Investment

companies at some point in the period. At
a February 2003 meeting with VT Finance

$

Sold
2,187.90
1,674.93
1,943.91
1 ,622.43
2,960.87
1 ,946.91
2,797.97

$
$
$
$

15,134.92
50,23804
(20,000.00)
30,238.04

$
$

15,11902
25,669.56

$
$
$
$
$

!Ii

f2
Divide by Avg. Value

58.90%

MCD
S

S
WEN

BAX

HCA
SNV
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students in Omaha, Buffett explained that it only makes sense to sell when there is
another investment option that offers better value. 15

If this is true, and if it is only

common to come up with good investment ideas once per year like Buffett says (quoted
above), then I must have transferred money too frequently among less-than-spectacular
investments. Indeed, I did sell my two favorite investments (MCD and S) way too early,
and, thus, I missed out on some spectacular gains. My failure to "buy and hold" also has
significant tax implications. Because I neglected to hold many of my investments before
holding them for one year, my capital gains tax rate will be higher than it would have
otherwise been. Moreover, because I was so active, I had to pay many more commission
fees to my broker. Considering that I made a total of 25 trades and commissions cost
$10.99 per trade, I spent a total of $252.75, or 1.26% of my principle investment in fees
alone.

The lesson here is that it pays to be a patient investor. In his 1991 Letter to

Shareholders, Buffett claims, "Our stay-put behavior reflects our view that the stock
market serves as a relocation center at which money is moved from the active to the
patient."

9

This is certainly something that I will need to continue to work on.

Buffett makes a distinction between two types of mistakes-those of
commission and those of omission. In his October 2003 presentation to DT students,
Buffett insisted, "Our biggest mistakes have been those of omission rather than
commission."

14

I believe the same is true for me. Although it does not show up as a loss

on my performance record, my failure to demonstrate courage and buy a meaningful
amount of my favorite investments seriously hindered my performance potential.

For

instance, I only purchased $1,356 worth of MCD, which represented a modest 6.8% of
my total portfolio. Similarly, I only bought $1,622 ofHD and $2,195 of S, representing
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only 8.1% and 11% of my portfolio, respectively. These were my favorite investments,
yet they comprised a relatively small portion of my portfolio. I have since become better
at concentrating, even investing well over 16% of my portfolio into my current CAH
position. This kind of concentration is necessary to achieve above average results.

Closing Thoughts

While the performance of my portfolio is certainly not indicative of future
potential, grand conclusions about value investing or my ability were never intended. As
for value investing, the successes of Benjamin Graham and Warren Buffett speak for
themselves. As for me, only time can tell.
The important lesson here is that managing this portfolio has been an invaluable
experience in and of itself

To be a successful investor, a person needs to practice

investing. As demonstrated by my own failures, it is not enough to simply understand
how to value a company and what to look for. Investing a substantial amount of personal

capital can be very emotional, and it takes a great deal of practice to discipline oneself so
that emotion does not interfere with clear and simple logic. At a February 2003 meeting
in Omaha with UT students, when answering a student's question about the value of realmoney investment programs such as the TVA Investment Challenge, Mr. Buffett replied,
"There is no substitute for losing your own money."

15

While I did not lose any money, I

certainly agree that there is no substitute for this invaluable learning experience. I would
strongly encourage anyone interested in investments to put their own money on the line.
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Appendix
Transaction Data:

15

112612004 Dividend Reoeipt

GE

1/1512004 Dividend Receipt

CAH

2.34

1212312003 Dividend Receipt

HOI

3.2

1211312003 Dividend Reoeipt

HD

5.25

1211512003 Dividend Reoeipt

KO

11

12/412003 Dividend Reoeipt

PFE

7.5

121112003 Dividend Receipt

HCA

2.3

1112112003 Buy or Sell Security

BUY 175.000 SHARES TAP B @14.35

~2~27.2.4

1112112003 Buy or Sell Security

SELL 100.000 SHARES SNV @ 28,031

2797.97

111712003 Buy or Sell Security

BUY 35.000 SHARES CAH @ 57.06

-2(:(:8.0~

111712003 Buy or Sell Security

SELL 50.000 SHARES HCA @ 39.16

1946.91

1012712003 Dividend Receipt

GE

1012312003 Buy or Sell Security

BUY 80.000 SHARES HMC @ 19.41

1011512003 Dividend Receipt

CAH

14.25
·i56'1.79
1.23

101112003 Buy or Sell Security

BUY 150.000 SHARES HMC @ 20.10

-3025.33

101112003 Buy or Sell Security

SELL 100.000 SHARES BAX @ 29.72

2960.S7

101112003 Buy or Sell Security

SELL 50.000 SHARES \olEN @ 32.67

1622.43

101112003 Dividend Receipt

KO

101112003 Dividend Receipt

SNV

16.5

3/3012003 Dividend Receipt

HOI

1.6

911812003 Dividend Receipt

HD

5.25

91412003 Dividend Receipt

PFE

7.5

91212003 Dividend Receipt

HCA

2.3

811812003 Dividend Receipt

\olEN

3

81812003 Buy or Sell Security

BUY 43.000 SHARES CAH @ 58.99

11

~254'l.~;

7125/2003 Dividend Receipt

GE

711612003 Buy or Sell Security

SELL 50.000 SHARES S@ 39.10

711112003 Buy or Sell Security

BUY 50.000 SHARES HCA @ 32.10

-If;15.~I$

71312003 Buy or Sell Security

BUY 100.000 SHARES BAX @ 25_07

-2517.33

14.25
1943.91
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Appendix
7/1/2003 Dividend Receipt

SNV

7/112003 Dividend Receipt

S

7/1/2003 Dividend Receipt

KO

16.5
23

11
0.07

6/30/2003 Interest Receipt

INTEREST CREDIT

6/26/2003 Dividend Receipt

HD

4.5

6/20/2003 Dividend Receipt

HOI

1.6

6/18/2003 Buy or Sell Security

SELL 50.000 SHARES S @ 33.76

6/18/2003 Buy or Sell Security

SELL 100.000 SHARES MCD @ 22.01

1674.93
2187.9

6/5/2003 Dividend Receipt

PFE

7.5

6/2/2003 Dividend Receipt

HCA

1.3

6/2/2003 Interest Receipt

INTEREST CREDIT

0.05
:)

5/19/2003 Dividend Receipt

'WEN

4/28/2003 Interest Receipt

INTEREST CREDIT

412512003 Dio.lidend Receipt

GE

4125/2003 Buy or Sell Security

BUY 100.000 SHARES SNV @ 19.19

·1931 :3:3

4/23/2003 Buy or Sell Security

BUY 65.000 SHARES HCA@30.10

·j%3M

4/1/2003 Dividend Receipt

0.36
14.25

KO

11

3/31/2003 Interest Receipt

INTEREST CREDIT

3/28/2003 Dividend Receipt

HD

4.5

3/24/2003 Dividend Receipt

HOI

1.4

3/3/2003 Buy or Sell Security

BUY 100.000 SHARES S @ 21.95

3/3/2003 Interest Receipt

INTEREST CREDIT

0.39

_218;;
1.16

2/24/2003 Buy or Sell Security

BUY 40.000 SHARES HOI @ 39.35

·'5j·!;

2/19/2003 Buy or Sell Security

BUY 50.000 SHARES 'WEN @ 25.08

·:258

2/19/2003 Buy or Sell Security

BUY 100.000 SHARES MCD @ 13.56

~1J58

2/19/2003 Buy or Sell Security

BUY 1.000 SHARES BRK B @ 2118.00

·2;21)

Miscellaneous Corporate
2/10/2003 Action

COMMISSION ADJUSTMENT
774684025 1094194495

10.99

2110/2003 Buy or Sell Security

BUY 75.000 SHARES HD @ 21.63

.iI32<1.2f<

2/10/2003 Buy or Sell Security

BUY 75.000 SHARES GE @ 22.57

·;~94

2/10/2003 Buy or Sell Security

BUY 50.000 SHARES PFE @ 28.49

2/10/2003 Buy or Sell Security

BUY 50.000 SHARES KO @ 39.51

2/3/2003 Interest Receipt

INTEREST CREDIT

1/30/2003 Cash Receipt

75

·H76.5
.1:3:n~~1

0.11
20000
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Appendix

The Portfolio
2/1112004
Symbol
KO

Shares
Price
$
51.80

PFE ...... J. 38.15
GEJ
33.08
HD
$
36.83
BRKB
$ 3,057.00
HDI$53.36
HCA
$
43.89
CAH
$
65.75
HMC
$
21.62
TAP.B
$
18.20

Value\iVeight
PIE
50 $
2,590.00 .
8.26%
50$1,907.50
6.09%
75 $
2,481.00 •
7.92%
8.81 %

······}5):2,762.25
1
40
65
78
230
175

Cash

$
$
$
$
$
$

......... $
Total:

•$

3,05700
2,134.40
2,852.85
5,128.50
4,972.60
3,185.00

•
.
.
.
•

9.75%
"6.810/0'
9.10%
16.36%
15.87%
10.16%

268.01 •

0.86%

31,339.11'

100.00%

...

Div
24.67
16.03..
18.69
17.97
24.68
16.94
13.63
15.51
9.7
7.95

0.88
0.68
0.8
0.28
0
0.32
0.52
0.12
0.16
0.32

Weighted Beta
Div. Yield Beta
0.0236
1.70%
0.286
0.0230
1.78%
0.378
0.0873
2.42%
1.103
1.401
0.1235
0.76%
0.415
0.0405
0.00%
0.0746
0.60%
1.095
0.0137
118%
0.15
0.0172
0.18%
0.105
0.0843
0.74%
0.531
0.6
0.0610
1.76%

0.5486

16.577

Return Information
Beginni~g Cash Balance:

$

···5t;.70%

Performance:

,.......

4t.79%

S&P 500 Performance:

2/1112003
2/1112004
div
........ adjusted

.

829.2
1157.76
18
1175.76

...................

(After Fees) .

.~" ............ , ............
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Appendix

Realized Gains
Symbol

MCD
S

% Gain
Profit
Proceeds
Basis
61.11 %
829.90
2,187.90 • $
$ ..... 1,358 .qq . . $ ...............................
64.72%
2,197.00 $ 1,674.93 $ 1,421.84
$
......

.. $ ...... 1,~43.91

SNV

1,256.00
$
$ ........ ~,517}9
1,615.99
$
$ ........ 1,~31.99

$ 1,622.43 $
2,960.87 • $
$ ..........................
$ 1,946.91 • $
$ ),797.97 $

366.43
442.88
330.92
865.98

29.17%
17.59%
20.48%·
44.82%

Totals:

$1q,8T6.~?

$ .15,1}4.~? $4,~?!-95

39.15%·

WEN

BAX
HCA

Unrealized Gains
Value

50 $
2,590.00
50 $1,~qr5Q
75 $
2,481.00
75 .$2l62.25
1 $
3,057.00
40 $ ....... 2,1)4AQ
65 $
2,852.85
78 $5,128.fjQ
230 $
4,972.60
175 $},18?Oq
Cash

Basis:

$

268.01

$29,000.09. Total Value: .. $ ..... 31,33~.11 ....

Price Paid
Basis
Unreal GIL % GIL
$
39.51 $ 1,975.50 $ 614.50
31.11 %
$
29.49 $1,474):iQ $ 433.00

$
$

$
$
$

$
$

$

22.57 $ 1,692.75 $ 788.25
21.63J1 ,62~)?$1)40.00
2,118.00 $ 2,118.00 $ 939.00
39.35 $1):i74.QO $ 560.40.
30.10 $ 1,956.50$896.35
58.12JA,53:3-6? $ 594.84.
19.86 $ 4,567.80 $ 404.80.
14.95 $2,616)5 $ 568.75

35.60%
45.81%
13.12%

